Agrarian institutions and economic growth : was the sale of baldíos responsible of the Castilian agrarian crisis at the end of sixteenth century? by Álvarez Nogal, Carlos
 1 
 
 
Working Paper 03-05                 Economic History and Institutions Dept.  
Economic History and Institutions Series 01                  Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
January 2003                      Calle Madrid 126 
 28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (34) 91 624 9574 
 
 
AGRARIAN INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: WAS THE SALE 
OF BALDÍOS RESPONSIBLE OF THE CASTILIAN AGRARIAN CRISIS AT 
THE END OF SIXTEENTH CENTURY?∗ 
Carlos Álvarez+ 
Abstract_______________________________________________________________ 
The traditional literature about the Castilian agriculture has interpreted the sale of 
baldíos as one of the main causes of the decline of Castile during the seventeenth century. The 
sale obligated the peasant to buy the land if he wanted to continue working on it. Many of these 
lands were marginal and poor soils, so the growth of production cost would have led many 
farmers to the ruin and poverty. Many of them had to migrate to other regions, causing a deep 
fall of agriculture production, the main production activity of Castile’s economy at that period of 
time. 
This paper shows that Castile entered in decadence not because the baldíos were sold but 
because the reasons inviting people to use more land and to increase production during the first 
half of the sixteenth century disappeared around 1590. Instead of seeing exclusively the new costs 
faced by the farmer after the sale, this paper explores what happened with revenues from 
plowing more land.  
Baldíos was an institution that helped an increase of production through expansion of 
land and labor. Who was the owner of these lands seem to be indifferent in order to explain the 
amount of production factor used on agriculture. If baldíos was not the reason that provoked a 
huge migration in the Castilian countryside, then, who was the responsible?. Problems to 
maintain the returns from agriculture, and not the unexpected increase in the price of land, were 
the real cause of the final crisis at the end of the sixteenth century. 
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Introduction 
Traditionally, waste lands (baldíos), as part of the rural common property, have 
been considered a great benefit institution for Castilian population1. Baldíos allowed the 
lower levels of rural society to enjoy a considerable measure of economic independence, 
free from the obligations of tenancy and landownership. It made them a very important 
piece of the agricultural expansion happened during the sixteenth century. The 
traditional patterns of baldíos must have had great social implications as well because 
the feeling of community and the spirit of individual self-reliance were involved2.  
However, the Monarchy saw in these sort of lands a way to solve part of its fiscal 
problems in the second half of the sixteenth century. The Crown needed to raise more 
funds to continue paying its bankers in order to maintain its European policy. The fiscal 
system was not providing enough revenues for the war in Europe. So, the Monarchy 
decided to sell baldíos in order to raise funds. Contemporaries and scholars have 
considered this process of sale the cause of the agriculture decay by the increasing costs 
imposed over poor quality lands. The population that worked these sorts of lands could 
not pay the price and they had to leave the countryside. The problems in the agriculture 
would have extended to the industry and trade, provoking the collapse of the whole 
Castilian economy. 
This paper tries to explore this issue using some basic ideas from the economic 
theory of demand. It will help to provide an alternative explanation about the role 
played by baldíos and its consequences on the Castilian agricultural sector.  
The literature about this issue accepts some key assumptions. First, Castile had a 
market for agrarian products but the majority of peasants did not participate on it. Thus, 
the improvements happened in trade and markets and the developments of new 
financial instruments and institutions during the late of Middle Age did not have any 
consequence on the peasants as decision makers. They did not have any incentives from 
markets to increase production. Nobility and the Church controlled the market and its 
profits. These groups sold the products that they obtained from lease their lands. 
                                                 
1 The word baldío had several meanings in sixteenth-century Castile. Baldíos were considered to be crown lands 
ungranted and unused, but they could also be crown lands that had been usurped into the private domain. Because of 
the free-use privileges associated with crown lands, the baldíos were considered to be the public domain, although 
under royal control. Vassberg (1974), pp. 385-6. 
2 Vassberg (1975), p. 651. 
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Second, the agricultural expansion took place to feed a growing and hungry population. 
Peasants increased production just because they have to survive.  
Taking these assumptions as starting points, the sale of baldíos carried out by the 
Crown during the second half of the sixteenth century seems to be at the origin of the 
Castilian decadence for many authors3. It expelled a great part of Castilian population 
because it meant to increase the costs of many peasants working poor soils and living in 
subsistence levels permanently. Deserted villages, vagabonds, and the drop of agrarian 
production have been attributed by many economic historians to the abridgment of 
labor in agriculture that followed the sale of baldíos in the sixteenth century4. Peasants 
could not continue plowing those lands, so they had to migrate, causing the fall of 
agrarian production. Many authors see it as the beginning of the ruin of the whole 
Castile in the seventeenth century because it also affected to the industrial and service 
sectors. 
This paper tries to show that the sale of baldios had consequences over the 
distribution of revenues from agriculture and perhaps affected the welfare of many 
peasants but it was nothing to do with the crisis of the Castilian agriculture at the end of 
the sixteenth century. 
This paper starts from different assumptions. First, there were a development of 
new markets for agriculture products and the growing population working in the 
countryside had access to them. Second, the expansion of the agriculture responded to 
the commercial incentives created for those markets on the Castilian peasants because of 
the growth of their prices in the sixteenth century.  
Baldíos in Castile were a kind of free land for the growing population. The 
Crown was the real owner of baldios, but it did not have any interest in plowing or 
administering these lands by itself, so the king offered them temporarily to the 
communities and towns of Castile as communal property. Any farmer did not get the 
property ever, but he could plow the land without paying rent in a lot of cases. Each 
community organized by itself the use of this sort of land. When the market started to 
provide clear profits from a higher production because of higher prices, there was a 
huge incentive to increase production and do it over new lands was the cheaper way.  
                                                 
3 Gómez Mendoza (1967), Anes (1970), García Sanz (1980), Vassberg (1978 y 1983),  Marcos Martín (2000).  
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section I explains what means baldíos in Castile 
and how the sale of baldíos happened during the sixteenth century. Section II explains 
the arguments used by the historiography so far to link the sale of baldios and the 
decadence of Castile. Section III presents the model that this paper uses to analyze this 
issue. Section IV shows the utility of the model to explain the historical evidences before, 
during and after the sale of baldíos. In the first period (1500-1570), baldíos explains why 
the cost of land did not increase, even though population working in the countryside 
and plowing land grew. During the second period (1570-1590), the sale of baldíos by the 
Crown pushed up the cost of production in that lands, but it did not mean an expulsion 
of people from their lands or a reduction of land plowed. In the third period (1590-1650), 
prices of product grew less than cost of production and it caused that people gave up 
their land, migrating to other areas, and that many land became waste again as it was 
before 1500. Problems to maintain markets were the real problem for the Castilian 
agrarian sector at the end of the sixteenth century. Section V presents the conclusions. 
I. The sale of common land in Castile in the sixteenth century 
The privatization of land in Castile was a long process that occurred between the 
Middle Age and the nineteenth century. The sale of land by the Crown during the 
sixteenth century affected mostly a kind of common lands, named baldíos. These baldíos, 
like the majority of common lands, surged in the Reconquest period, when all the land 
without a clear owner was taken by the Monarchy5. The municipalities who governed 
the rights over their jurisdiction exploited them, coordinating its plowing among 
everybody inside of the village.  
For centuries, most of this land was used as pasture, but when the population 
started to grow at the beginning of the sixteenth century, crops were planted in them. 
The communal authorities coordinated the distribution among the peasants that 
demanded more land. The peasants received access to these lands free or for a nominal 
fee, for periods of between four or eight years that had to be renovated. The putting of 
this new land to crops allowed a rapid increase in the agrarian production and 
population in Castile during the sixteenth century. 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 García Sanz (1980), Yun (1987a), pp. 285-305. 
5 Vassberg (1983), p. 27. 
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From the middle of the sixteenth century, the Crown, faced by the rising costs of 
its expensive wars in Europe, found it necessary to increase its rents and taxes. The sale 
of land was one of the easier methods used by the Monarchy to get more revenues. 
Justifying itself by the lack of titles of ownership for many of these common lands, the 
Crown was able to sell an important amount of them6. In many cases, the initiative for 
such land sales came from the villages themselves. They had now the opportunity to 
take control over territories that always have been managed by cities or institutions 
hierarchically higher to them7.  
Table 1. Monarchy revenues from the sale of baldíos between 1550-1600 (maravedis)8 
Periodos Nominal % Real 
(1550-59=100) 
% 
1550-59 5.121.145 0.3 5.121.145  0.4 
1560-69 126.651.611 6.8 96.242.559 8.7 
1570-79 406.768.998 22 278.107.964 25 
1580-89 944.744.028 51.3 539.921.212 48.7 
1590-99 355.809.491 19.3 184.985.354 16.7 
unknown 6.020.547 0.3 6.020.547 0.5 
Total 1.839.095.273 100 1.110.398.781 100 
Notes: Nominal revenues from Vassberg. Real revenues deflated using Martín Aceña data.  
Sources: Vassberg (1983), table 6, p. 242. Martín Aceña (1992). 
 
This extensive sale of communal lands affected different parts of Castile in 
different periods of time. During the 1560s the Council of Finance administered a pilot 
scheme in Granada where communal lands were sold off, frequently at prices 
substantially below the market rate9. Sales took off in Castile during the 1570s to reach 
their peak in the 1580s10 (table 1). The process ended when Philip II agreed to stop such 
sales as a condition imposed by the Cortes to approve a new extension of the “millones” 
tax in 1598. 
The common lands sold represented, at least in some areas, a considerable part of 
the municipalities-hinterlands. Yun estimates that they might well have accounted for 30 
                                                 
6 Gómez Mendoza (1967), p. 517 y ss. Vassberg (1983), pp. 94-95. 
7 Izquierdo Martín and Sánchez León (1998). 
8 A higher price of land neutralizes the effect of inflation over this process. The table helps to show that the amounts of 
this table are shown  not important as monetary income for the Royal Finance of Castile  for the income  
9 Vassberg (1983), pp. 71-79. 
10 Vassberg (1983), pp. 238 y 244. For instance, Cartagena received an offer to sell baldíos in 1563, while the process 
in Old Castile was especially important between 1585 and 1588, especially the areas of Valladolid and Zamora. Díaz 
Sanz (1995), p. 149. The sale in Soria started in 1584. 
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to 40 per cent of the total area of Tierra de Campos11, while in the district of Coca the 
figure was around 28 per cent12.  
This process of communal land sales at least in the North Castile, actually 
contributed to the expansion of small and medium sized properties instead of to land 
concentration13. Much of the land sold was bought by the peasants who had previously 
been farming it or by the municipalities themselves14. For instance, in the privatization 
of the baldíos in the Land of Soria almost all the members (vecinos) of a village bought 
land. Many times, the purchase was made collectively, instead of individually15. It 
helped to reduce transaction costs and the Crown could receive its price more easily. 
This sale of common lands took place at the same time that the sale of lands and 
jurisdiction from the church and the royal patrimony. It was another way to increase the 
revenues of the Monarchy after 157816. Many villages and small towns also took 
advantage of these sales to buy their own lands of their jurisdiction in order to gain 
autonomy from the city or institution, which owned them before. To be able to pay the 
price of their freedom, they sold or rented baldíos and commons lands with permission 
of the Crown. 
A general increase of fiscal pressure from the Crown also affected the sale of 
common lands because the municipalities asked permission to the king to sell or rent 
their common lands in order to pay the new taxes17. The disadvantage of this process 
was that it caused an increase in the cost of production. Peasants had initially been 
working free lands, now they had to pay for the use of them. Many scholars have seen in 
these payments the root of the indebtedness of the Castilian peasant, because councils 
and farmers had to take out heavy mortgages to pay for the properties in the first place. 
These rents paid by the peasants from the 1580s onward significantly narrowed their 
profit margins and created even further hardship as their payments coincided with the 
end of a period of expansion in agricultural demand and the beginning of a economic 
recession. 
                                                 
11 Yun (1983), p. 267. 
12 García Sanz (1980), pp. 117-118. 
13 Bernal (1979), p. 104. 
14 Vassberg, (1983), pp. 234-6. Vassberg (1978), pp. 145-167. Alvar (1990), pp. 97-131. 
15 Díaz Sanz (1995), p. 169. 
16 Faya Díaz (1992, 1998). Bernardo (1996). 
17 Bilbao (1990), pp. 45-63. 
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Viñas y Mey’ asserted that small and medium-sized peasants relied on the 
extensive use of land mortgages (censo al quitar) to finance expansion during the growth 
period of the economy18. When the boom collapsed, they could no longer make their 
payments and were ruined. But there is not evidence to support this claim. In fact, 
Nader did not find the heavy indebtedness essential to the Viñas model when she 
studied the province of Guadalajara19. Vassberg also denies this hypothesis as true for 
the whole Castile, although he recognizes that there was a decline in the quality of life of 
the peasants due to a sharp fall in production and the increase of costs as a consequence 
of the sale of common lands by the Crown20.  
II. A very old argument: the sale of baldíos and the peasant indebtedness as 
the origin of the Castilian economic crises 
The sale of baldíos and common lands during the second half of the sixteenth 
century as one of the main causes of Castile’s economic decline has been a hypothesis 
very resistant to the passage of the time.  
The first to criticize these land sales were many of the contemporaries of this 
process. Several sectors of the society acted together in order to convince the Monarchy 
that the sale of baldíos had to be stopped. The most affected by the process of selling 
land adopted a frontal opposition. The Cortes, the Parliament where the most important 
cities of Castile had representation, and other institutions with prior access to the 
common lands, such as the Mesta, was opposed to the sale21. At the same time, the 
arbitristas, a leading group of writers that analyzed the economy and society of Castile in 
this period, denounced the selling of baldíos as an attack on the small farmer, on the 
national agriculture and on the whole Castilian economy. 
Caxa de Leruela, the defender of the cattle industry, condemned the sale of 
baldíos as the main reason for its decadence because without pasture, the cattle had 
decreased, when it had been one of the richest resources of the Castilian economy22. It 
had led to a sharp rise in the cost of meat and wool. 
                                                 
18 Viñas y Mey (1941). 
19 Nader (1981). 
20 García Sanz (1989), pp. 206-226. 
21 Gómez Mendoza (1967), García Sanz (1980).  
22 Caxa de Leruela (1631), chapter 3º, p. 2. 
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Cellorigo, writing in 1600, called the high cost of renting land the most active 
cause of peasant misery23. Some ministers of the Monarchy also shared the idea that the 
sale of common lands was one of the worst things that the king had permitted. For 
instance, La Junta de Reformación, the commission created by the Crown to find solutions 
to the economic problems of Castile in the seventeenth century, thought that the sale of 
baldíos: 
“The sales of baldíos have caused the destruction of many villages and 
small towns, because the majority of vassals do not have land to sow or any 
pasture to feed their oxen and mules. Their only way to get land is renting it 
from landowners. These have bought all the common land because they are rich 
and now they lease it at the highest prices they can. The poor peasants, are so 
burdened, that even if they pay the first and the second year of rent, they are 
overwhelmed by the third year, so they give up their work, becoming so poor 
that they see themselves forced to leave their homes ”24.   
 
 
This text shows how many contemporaries saw the problem. They linked 
emigration from the Castilian countryside with the higher land cost that have been 
caused by the sale of baldíos. However, it is difficult to figure out how an increase of the 
supply of land in the market could increase its price. Actually, the data available show 
clearly that the rents were declining right after 1580, when the most important volume of 
sales started. As García Sanz has calculated, the rent followed the same downward 
movement of the population. In the case of the lands of the Cabildo of the Cathedral of 
Segovia rents went down by 30 per cent between 1570-165925. In Segovia and Tierra de 
Campos, the production of wheat and barley decreased more than 40 per cent between 
1580 and 1630-1640. In a representative group of villages of Valladolid a similar process 
occurred, with rents dropping around 50 per cent. In Soria, for instance, the Crown did 
not meet its goals with the sales because “the land was sold at excessively cheap 
prices”26.  
Then, when the contemporaries were speaking about “expensive prices”, it 
means that after the sale, the peasants had to pay for working a land that had been free 
                                                 
23 González de Cellorigo (1600), fol. 24. See chapter 2, n.3 
24 “Discurso breve y sumario de las causas porque se ha disminuido la población” 1621. La Junta de Reformación, 
document XLII, n. 15. quoted by Domínguez Ortiz (1987), p. 91. 
25 García Sanz (1979), p. 308. 
26 Díaz Sanz (1995), p. 177. 
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before. This is very different than to assert that the price of land in Castile increased 
from the process of sale. 
The Cortes, the arbitristas, and the clergy from the pulpit deplored the increasing 
peasant indebtedness. The Cortes of Madrid (1592-8) declared that the peasants were so 
burdened with debts that they were unable to make their payments27. Sancho de 
Moncada, another arbitrista, wrote, “ The countryside is deserted, the labradores having 
fled their poverty, overburdened with debts and foreclosures”28. Fernandez Navarrete 
compared the peasant debts to a voracious insect, which devoured everything the 
workers could produce29. 
Curiously, many of these old arguments against the privatization of land have 
been repeated over and over again including the most recent studies about Castilian 
economic history30. They stay in the literature as unquestioned premises. The 
privatization of a significant part of the municipal lands, spurred on by the considerable 
increases in the cost of pasturage and municipal spending, contributed to the decline of 
the basic unit of agrarian production in Castile: the small farmer31.  
The sale is criticized as the old arbitristas did, blaming the Crown and its 
growing fiscal pressure for the Castilian crisis32. The sale of common land is considered 
an indirect tax on the peasants, the weakest link in the production chain. Moreover, it 
also implied the destruction of the main social security system at that time and the 
proletarization of the smallholder. 
Historians have considered the Castilian peasant as an economic agent 
permanently outside of the market. Hence, the peasant did not respond to the economic 
incentives created by the expansion during the first half of the sixteenth century. 
According to this traditional vision, agricultural production was just oriented to feed the 
population growth, which always was close to subsistence levels33. The self-sufficiency 
was the dominant characteristic of the Castile agriculture from this point of view. Due to 
                                                 
27 Actas (1869-1918), vol. XIII, p. 136. 
28 Vassberg (1984), p. 205. 
29 Fernández Navarrete (1626), p. 270. Vassberg (1984), p. 205. 
30 Braudel (1953) vol. II, p. 201. Bennasar (1967), pp. 317, 318, 327 y 328, Gómez Mendoza (1967), Anes (1970), 
Garcia Sanz (1980).Vassberg (1984), p. 174. García Sanz (1989), p. 220. Yun (1989), p. 565. García Sanz (1994), p. 
22. The same argument in Soria: Díaz Sanz (1995), p. 177. Marcos (2000). 
31 Yun (1990), p. 565.  
32 Larraz (1943), p. 75. Wilson and Parker (1985), p. 60. 
33 Vassberg (1984), p. 166 and 188. 
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the little money that they used, just to pay rents and taxes, the peasants would not have 
enough coins for regular purchases in the market. 
In this scenario, the Malthusian crisis was a permanent threat because the growth 
of production was based just on free marginal lands of doubtful quality. Serious stresses 
soon appeared in the Castilian economy as population and urban development 
outstripped its economic potential34. 
According to this argument, there is no space to consider that many times, the 
peasant’s expansion into new land was a move to increase their profits by benefiting 
from higher prices in the markets. That profits could be made from working marginal 
and poor soils, once the price was right. In spite of the strong presence of the 
indebtedness hypothesis in the literature, during the last years new data has been 
published suggesting that there are other ways to analyze this issue. These data open the 
door to new research and new interpretations about the process of growth and decline 
of the agrarian sector in Castile. Tools provided by economic theory, especially from the 
marginal analysis of production factors, help to understand better the whole process. 
III. Analysis of variation in the marginal revenue of land without any 
technological change 
Before considering the available data, it is necessary introduce the basic ideas 
and principals used to study the production function in marginal terms. Output can be 
expressed as a function of inputs combination used in the production process, and 
therefore output price may be expressed as a different function of the combination of 
these inputs. Consider constant the capital factor, so the production function uses land 
and labor. Consider also that there is not any technical change. Historical studies have 
shown that there was not any revolutionary technological change during the sixteenth 
century in Castile. Economic historians agree that the Castilian agrarian growth was 
basically based on an expansion of land, requiring more and more workers.  
Total revenue (TR) from agriculture activity will be its price times output for any 
combination of inputs.  
Total Revenue (TR) = Price (P) ∙ Quantity of output (q)   (1) 
                                                 
34 Gentil da Silva (1967), pp. 19-26. Salomon (1964), pp. 42-49. 
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a) The Revenue effect 
Marginal revenue product of a factor is defined as the change in total revenue 
per unit change in the use of that factor. For example, ∆R/∆land, is the marginal revenue 
product of factor “land” (MRPland). As both price and output may change due to an 
increase in the use of factor “land”, we must use the product rule to determine the 
MRPland: 
MRPland = ∆R/∆land = P ∙ ∆q/∆land + q ∙ ∆P/∆land   
 (2) 
The term ∆P/∆land, the rate at which price varies with the use of factor “land” 
may itself be broken down into two effects: the change in output occasioned by the use 
of more of the factor “land”, ∆q/∆land, and the change in price due to the offering of 
more output for sale, ∆P/∆q (when the farmer is a price searcher).  
∆P/∆land = ∆P/∆q ∙ ∆q/∆land      
 (3) 
If (2) is substituted into equation (1) and factoring out gives: 
MRPland = ∆q/∆land ∙ [P + q ∙ ∆P/∆q] = MPPland ∙ MR   (4) 
The term inside the brackets is the farmer’s marginal revenue. Marginal revenue 
product is simply ∆q/∆land times marginal revenue itself. The change in output per unit 
change in the use of factor “land” (∆q/∆land) is the marginal physical product of that 
factor (MPPland). Marginal revenue product (MRPland) is therefore simply the 
marginal physical product of the factor times marginal revenue. When the farmer is a 
price taker, the marginal revenue product is simply ∆q/∆land times the price of output. 
MRPland = ∆q/∆land ∙ P = MPPland ∙ P     (5) 
An increase in the use of a factor of production will increase revenue in the 
following way. It will increase output at a rate equal to MPPland. The effect of this 
output change on total revenue is reflected by marginal revenue. Marginal revenue 
gives us the rate of change in revenue per unit change in output.  
Holding constant the use of all other factors, we may identify a MRPland curve 
that relates the use of the varying factor “land” to the value of its marginal revenue. 
Marginal revenue product must decrease with the expansion of factor “a” due to the law 
of diminishing returns. Marginal revenue either diminishes with output when the 
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elasticity of demand is not infinite. Increases in the use of other factor will typically 
increase MPPland and therefore shift curve MRPland upward at each quantity of factor 
“land”. In Castile during the sixteenth century, we consider that the production factors 
that grew were land and labor. A change in prices of output also can shift the curve 
MRPland upward at each quantity of factor “land”. 
b) The cost. 
To increase the use of a production factor will affect cost in a more 
straightforward way. The cost of a resource is typically the total spending for its use. 
Spending on any quantity of factor “land” is simply that quantity times its price. Total 
spending on “a” is therefore given by the following expression: 
Spending on land (C) = P (land) ∙ q (land)     (6) 
Increased use of factor “land” will therefore increase spending at the following 
rate per unit change in “land”. This rate of change in spending on factor a per unit of its 
use is defined as the marginal factor cost of “land” (MFCland): 
∆C/∆land = MFCland = Pland + land ∙ ∆Pland/∆land = Pland (land) (1+1/!)
 (7) 
We may also relate this expression to an elasticity (!). The marginal factor cost 
curve will have a slope equal to or greater than zero. Consider the case where the 
elasticity of supply of factor “land” to the firm is infinite, it means that the supply curve 
is horizontal. In this case MFCland can be expressed as simply 
MFCland = P (land)        (8) 
Marginal factor cost will simply be the constant factor price, Pa (a). In all other 
cases supply curves will slope upward. 
We can consider that Castilian peasants faced an almost horizontal supply curve 
of land since the end of fifteenth century. Marginal cost in terms of rent did not increase 
when they plowed new areas. Baldíos represented free land available to those willing to 
work on it. 
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c) Net Profits. 
Varying the amount of a factor affects revenues and costs. If a factor contributes 
more to increase revenues than costs at the margin, increasing its use will increase 
profits. If hiring an extra unit of a factor increases costs more than it adds to revenue, 
then obviously its use should be curtailed. Profits from the use of a factor will be 
maximized when the gain from its employment at the margin is just equal to its cost.  
MRPland = MFCland.  
The determinant of the profits-maximizing level of land employment in the 
agriculture is the production function for the peasant, the demand function for its 
output, and the supply function of the land itself. If we consider that the peasant is a 
price taker in both input and output markets, his demand for factors of production will 
be inversely related to price.  
Curve MRPland itself is the peasant’s demand curve for factor land and it must 
slope downward. If the price of the land goes up, the peasant will reduce the quantity 
used. Quantity demanded will be negatively affected by a factor price increasing. 
Consider the case where the peasant is a price taker in the output market with a 
perfect elastic demand curve for his output. In this case: 
MRPland = MPPland ∙ P (land) (1+1/infinite) = MPPland ∙ P (land) (9) 
Now let us also assume that the farmer is also a price taker in the demand of 
land. The MFCland in this case is simply the constant factor price, P(land), which curve 
is horizontal at this level. The intersection of MRPland and MFCland is the point where 
the peasant is maximizing profits.  
Any increase in the price of the output without changes in the cost of land will 
increase the amount used of this factor of production because it will increase the 
marginal revenue product of the farmer. When the marginal cost of the land is flat 
because land is free, the shift to the right of the MRPland curve does not imply an 
increase in the cost of land, so any new profits go to the worker.  
Could this model be applied to the Castilian agriculture expansion of the first 
half of the sixteenth century? Historical evidence seems to permit this approach and it 
shows that institutions of property rights played a crucial role.  
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IV. The sale of baldios was not the origin of the Castilian agrarian crisis 
a) The expansion of the agriculture in Castile: (1500-1570) 
Castilian agriculture did not experience any important improvement in 
productivity during the sixteenth century, because the traditional techniques used to 
work the land, did not change, except the spread of the mule instead of the oxen35. 
However, a lot of evidences show a great expansion of this economic activity.  
Figure 1. Expansion of land (1500-1570) 
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MRPland1
land2land1
0
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An increase in the amount of land factor without any technological change 
means a parallel increase of factor labor too, because it is necessary to have the same 
proportion of land and labor to maintain at least the same marginal physical product 
(MPPland). It also implies that the supply of labor is perfectly elastic. 
An increase in the prices of output could be the engine to shift the curve MRP of 
land upward. When the availability of land and labor can be considered infinite because 
there are land free and a growing population, as it was in Castile at that period of time, 
                                                 
35 Anes (1970) Vassberg (1984). 
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the amount of land and labor employed in agriculture increases but the price of rental 
lands remains constant.  
The increase of product prices could be enough not only to compensate for any 
fall of productivity as consequence of the expansion even into marginal lands and poor 
soils  (figure 1). The agriculture returns were higher than before even with an increase in 
the land and the number of people working on it. 
Baldíos in Castile made possible that the price of land did not changed. A growth 
of returns from the increase of agrarian product prices in the Castilian markets and the 
parallel freeze costs of land permitted the plowing of new lands (baldios) with little 
capital investment and a great expansion of agriculture in products and workers. 
Historical data confirm the predictions of this model. 
The growth of the urban population in the sixteenth century created a bigger 
market for the agriculture products. In the Middle Age, the interior of Castile had been a 
region poorly articulated, both, locally and with the rest of Europe. Any movements of 
products had a high cost, so an important part of the output had been produced 
exclusively for home consumption. However, the market expanded at the end of the 
fifteenth century, with the necessity to provide enough food for increasingly larger cities 
like Valladolid, Seville, Burgos or Madrid. Twenty Castilian cities grew 84 per cent 
between 1530 and 159436. Castile’s population expanded from 4.4 to 6.6 million between 
1528-36 and 1591. The most rapid increase took place in the earlier decades37. 
The development of a more integrated market permitted farmers greater security 
of supplies, but also gave them the possibility of specializing in the crops most suited to 
local climatic and soil conditions, especially those which prices showed to be most 
profitable, like olive groves and vineyards38. The “Topographical Relations” of Philip II 
show this tendency to specialization in some products like wine39.  
To the increase in urban demand must also be added the increase and 
diversification of overseas demand, especially in areas from which it was profitable to 
export. Actually, the rise in the price of wine and oil was much more intense in 
Andalusia in the first half of the sixteenth century than in the North and Center of 
                                                 
36 Carande (1943), vol. I, p. 60. Anes (1994), p. 61. 
37 Ruiz Martin (1967), p. 197. 
38 Carande, (1943), vol. I, pp. 135-6. Bernal (1988), pp. 39-40. 
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Castile, increasing by 179 per cent for wine and 139 per cent for oil between 1501-10 and 
1540-5040. 
The incentive to increase agricultural production was helped by the well-known 
growing trend of prices. For example, the cereal prices tended to rise from the beginning 
of the sixteenth century. Between 1540-50 and 1590-1600 the price of wheat in Castile 
rose by 114 per cent, before stabilizing during the next half century. The production of 
wheat in many villages of Castile exceeded the barley output and the difference grew in 
the second half of the sixteenth century. In some towns, wheat, which was 59 per cent of 
both grains in 1557-1560, reached 68 percent in the last decade of the century. This was 
caused not only by the increase of population, but also by the development of new 
markets where the cereal could be sold41. The importance of the market in the 
agricultural expansion can be seen also in the growth of the population. The areas with 
the highest growth were those closest to big cities like Palencia and Valladolid in the 
first half of the sixteenth century and Madrid in the second half42. 
The increase in production was parallel by the growth of the extension ploughed. 
The repeated complaints about the lack of grazing and wood due to the expansion of 
agriculture, forced the Crown to issue laws to protect the woodland. However, these 
efforts were very little effective and the expansion of the agriculture did not find any 
serious obstacle. Collective institutions protected the peasant in his effort to get new 
lands and led agriculture to a great expansion. A great part of this movement was 
possible thanks that the new land incorporated to the agriculture during the initial phase 
was free, allowing to peasants to increase their revenues from land quickly while a 
higher competition increased production and worked to reach a new equilibrium. 
The increase of profits in the countryside contributed to raise the quality of life 
and the size of the peasant’s family. The level of life can be observed by the amount of 
meat and fish consumed. Old Castile had a higher consummation level of these products 
than the average in other areas of Europe43. 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 Anes (1994), p. 64. Viñas y Mey (1949-71), Toledo, I, pp. 87. 
40 Anes, (1994), p. 69. Hamilton (1975). 
41 Yun (1987), p. 168. 
42 Yun (1987), p. 160. 
43 Yun (1987), pp. 160-161. 
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These benefits also could be explained by the kind of contracts that many 
peasants had. For example, the censo enfitéutico was permanent, non-negotiable 
leasehold originally designed to attract farmers to new lands or to newly enclosed land. 
The tenant had to pay an annual rent in perpetuity, but he possessed the lease with full 
legal right (he could sell it, trade it, mortgage it and will it to his heirs). With the censo 
fixed at the relatively low rates of the late fifteenth century, it was a great advantage to 
have such a fixed price during the sixteenth-century price rise for the farmer44. 
Originally payable in kind, by the early modern period most censo enfitéutico payments 
had been commuted partly or wholly to coin. In other parts of Spain, for example 
Galicia, the foro was very extended. It was a kind of contract very similar to the censo. 
The large landowners used to lease their lands with foro, contracts rather than using the 
regular rental contract. For example, the monastery of San Martín Pinario made a rental 
contract for each 100 foros45.  
Even so, the landlords who received the rent in specie had also great benefits 
during this period because the increasing price of the products allowed them to get 
more revenues. In fact, the raw income of the nobility houses grew during the sixteenth 
century. The most important patrimony in the region of Madrid was the dukedom of 
Infantado. This house multiplied its income by 2,4 between 1530 and 1597, passing from 
50.000 to 120.000 ducats per year46. The duke of Medina Sidonia multiplied by four his 
income between 1510 and 159747.  
By the most widely used figure, noble incomes doubled from 1530 to 1595, while 
prices, according to Hamilton also doubled48. In the case of the county of Puñoenrostro, 
its most important resource was the rent of land and mills, accounting for 87 per cent of 
its income. Between 1530 and 1577, the count-received the double his original 1530 
income, reaching 15.000 ducats. This good period is explained by the increase of grain 
production and the sale of this product in Torrejón. The growth can be observed in his 
                                                 
44 Yun (1993), pp. 21-22. 
45 Gelabert (1982), p. 106. 
46 In the Segovia countryside, the growth of the rental land prices has been calculated around 7 percent between 1560 
and 1575-80. García Sanz (1986), p. 304. The growth of owners of “predios rústicos” in Madrid was around 20-25 
percent between 1560-1580. The income from “tercias de pan mediano” in the condal arcs grew by 23,7 percent 
between 1557-61 and 1576. López García (1998), p. 128. 
47 Ulloa (1977), p. 45. 
48 Hamilton (1975). Nader (1977), p. 415. 
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lands of Segovia and Madrid49. Similar trends were followed by the nobility economies 
in Aragon50 and Catalonia51. 1577 was the last good year. After this date, the numbers 
were maintained for two decades before a general drop. Actually, the acquisitive power 
fell in real terms for many patrimonies at the end of the sixteenth century. 
The accumulation of capital in the countryside and the city allowed an increase 
in the heads of local sheep owned by merchants and small farmers between 1526 and 
157852. It represented a great change in cattle raising, inducing also a transformation of 
the Mesta.  
The population grew not only in the urban centers, but also in the countryside. 
The figures for baptisms in rural parishes confirm the growth of population until 1570-
80. The evidence for the extension of cultivation related to the increase of population is 
abundant. In Valdaracete (Madrid), the increase of population was explained in 1580 
“by the plowing up of the land in the town’s district, which has therefore been able to 
feed and support more people”53. The studies made for the east of Old Castile show a 
rhythm of growth in the rural population by 0,26 per cent annual between1530 and 1586. 
It is not less intensive in the western area54.  
Historical evidences also confirm or at least did not deny that the price of land 
did not grow in the same proportion than prices of output during this period. It is very 
difficult to find price of land but looking at rents. They were frozen until 1550 in spite of 
an increasing demand of land, the increase of population in the countryside and the 
increase of agricultural product prices. Bartolomé Yun has shown that the rent per unit 
of land did not suffer any important change during this period55. The Church of San 
Cebrían de Villacreces’ land were rented for a price around 1 Hl. of wheat per hectare 
during the first 40 years of the sixteenth century, and its variation was between 0,5 y 1 
Hl./ha. A similar trend can be observed in Tierra de Santiago de Compostela (table 2). It 
                                                 
49 Hernanz Elvira (1998), p. 410. 
50 Abadía (1993), p. 55. In Aragón the seven more important nobility houses increased continuously its income during 
the sixteenth century. 
51 Duran (1985), pp. 12-13. The Catalan nobility income grew through the fifteenth century, reaching its higher point in 
1580-85. There was a faster growth between 1550 y 1585. 
52 Ruiz Martín (1974), pp. 271-285. 
53 Viñas Mey (1949), p. 627.  
54 Brumont (1978), pp. 249-268. Yun (1987), pp. 152-159. 
55 Yun (1987), pp. 171-172. 
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is observable also that the years of rent passed in the contracts from an average of 11.4 
years in 1513-28 to 6.9 in 1612-19.  
Table 2. Evolution of average rent prices in Tierra de Santiago. (1510-19= 100) 
1510-1519 100 1570-79 139.6 
1520-29 98.7 1580-89 133.9 
1530-39 98.7 1590-99 138 
1540-49 103.4 1600-09 143.5 
1550-59 112.9 1610-19 125.6 
1560-69 129.1   
Source: Gelabert (1982), p. 104. 
 
The rents in Tierra de Santiago started to grow after 1550. Someone could assert 
that Galicia is a very different area. Actually, the Crown was not able to sell there the 
same amount of baldíos than in Castile. However, people could move to other regions 
and Castile received people from the North of Spain during the sixteenth century56. Free 
land at some hundreds of kilometers is not a great obstacle to people willing to start a 
new life. 
b) The sale of baldios by the Crown (1570-1590)  
When the Crown decided to sell the baldíos, it changed immediately the costs 
faced by many Castilian peasants, especially on those working in the formerly free lands 
that will be sold. Although this process started in the 1550s, the most important phase 
took place between 1570 and 1590 (table 1).  
The traditional literature has interpreted the sale of baldíos as the main cause of 
peasant indebtedness. Figure 2 can explain this argument. Any increase in the price of 
land (MFCa) without changes in the use of factor labor will move the equilibrium point 
up through the MRPa curve, reducing the quantity of factor land that peasants want to 
work, but non-necessary expelling people from the agriculture because the movement is 
along the curve of marginal revenue of land (MRPland). This process will decrease 
dramatically the income of many families working the poorest soils. The peasant 
working in bad soils could not afford such increases in these costs and had to sell the 
land and work for others. Furthermore, there was an increase of fiscal pressure by the 
Crown during this period. In 1576, records of some villages of Castile show an increase 
                                                 
56 Vassberg (1998). 
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in the level of tax payments by 100 per cent on tercias and alcabalas, two of the most 
important taxes. It means that from 1561 until 1591, the amount paid by the small 
villages grew by 5 per cent, much faster than inflation57. All this led to a fast growth in 
the costs of production. 
However, this hypothesis has two problems. First, without any improvement in 
productivity, less land plowed will mean a reduction of total product, and historical 
data do not show any strong decrease in production. Second, why did people buy land 
when it was not profitable? Why did people invest on land that right after they 
abandon? Why did the price of baldíos increase through time when people is leaving the 
land? All these questions have the same answer: the process of land sale by the Crown 
took place at the same time that marginal revenue product of the farmer continued 
growing.  
Figure 2. The sale of baldíos pushed up marginal cost of land (1570-1590) 
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Given the lower returns that baldíos could have, the expansion into poor soils 
ended, but this did not affect the demand for fertile lands because prices of product 
remained growing (table 3). It means that the MRPland curve was moving to the right in 
the figure 2 during the whole sale. The sale of baldíos did not provoke any hard 
                                                 
57 Yun (1987), p. 277.  
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decrease of land plowed, or at least, if there was such a process of leaving land, it did 
not happen in the baldíos sold by the Crown. 
This increase of marginal revenue in the countryside explains why land prices 
increase during the process of sale and not before (P1 to P2). Data show that rents, 
avoided the competition of free soils, started to grow during this period. Actually, the 
demand for lands of good quality tended to increase, but now it was necessary to pay a 
higher price. There was also a fall in the time of the contracts from eight and four 
harvest to six and three or even less. The landowners reserved for themselves the 
opportunity to increase the price more frequently58. Data from the Cathedral of Segovia 
show that the price of rent on its land grew until the 1580s. The same happened in the 
plains of Zamora o Leon59. According to Bartolomé Yun, this increase in land rents rose 
to as much as 40 per cent of the gross output of certain farms in Tierra de Campos60. 
Table 3. Price index of Old Castile (1520-1650). Base 100: media 1601-1625. 
Years prices 
1521-1530 34,429 
1531-1540 35,288 
1541-1550 42,076 
1551-1560 54,694 
1561-1570 62,163 
1571-1580 75,197 
1581-1590 82,131 
1591-1600 95,489 
1601-1610 107,313 
1611-1620 94,239 
1621-1630 106,279 
1631-1640 115,115 
1641-1650 119,707 
Source: Llopis Agelán, E. Jerez, M. Álvaro, A, Fernández E. (2000). 
The high dependence of the land sale on growing product prices is coherent with 
data from the areas were baldíos were sold. The Crown was able to sell more land in 
those regions close to huge and dynamics markets as Valladolid, Madrid and Sevilla61. 
That increase of marginal revenue also explains that during this period there was 
not any strong exit of population from the countryside, but a deterioration of its welfare. 
Figure 2 shows that the marginal revenue inside of triangle (O,A,A´) was going to the 
                                                 
58 Yun (1987), p. 284. About increases of rent prices for 1570s and 1580s see López García (1990). 
59 García Sanz (1986), p. 304, Álvarez Vázquez (1984), pp. 614-617, Sebastian Amarilla (1989). 
60 Yun, “Producción agrícola en Tierra de Campos y Segovia”, p. 8. 
61 Vassberg (1975), pp. 650-654.  
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peasant’s pocket before the sale of baldíos, and after that it went to the Crown or to the 
new owners of those lands.  
Now, people working old baldíos got less returns from land than the rest of 
farmers. Many were able to keep their property but reducing their standard of living, 
which was going very close to the level of subsistence. It reduced the quality of life of 
the peasants and contributed to end the growing trend in the population. The figures for 
baptisms show a clear downward trend in every rural parish that has been studied62. 
According to Reher, the growth of population in Old Castile finished between 1575 and 
159063. 
Figure 2 also shows that the sale of baldíos was not the reason why people leave 
the Castilian countryside. Historical evidence shows that there was not a great expulsion 
of population from the countryside in this period. In fact, from the last decades of the 
sixteenth century, the population of Castile was undergoing a process of dispersal, or 
rather realization64.  
The model explains that it is possible to avoid a drop in the amount of land 
plowed when its marginal cost also increased. A shift of the MRPland curve to the right 
could compensate for the new higher costs, but it depends on an increase in the level of 
MPPland or higher prices of the output. Data show that there was such a rise in the 
prices, so returns from the agriculture still went up. The growth of product prices was 
less intense during this period, but they grew enough to keep people working in the 
countryside and even poor soil. The rise of wine and oil prices also continued during the 
second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth.  
Price control and other problems of the markets at the end of the sixteenth 
century were blocking the possible solutions of peasants to maintain their returns from 
agriculture. This period was especially sensible to the policy of price control (tasa) due to 
the downward trend of the marginal revenue in the farms. The general opinion against 
the tasa increased because the legal higher price for wheat and barley did not include the 
higher production costs, discouraging arable cultivation. 
                                                 
62 Bennassar (1967), pp. 162 y ss. Ruiz Martin (1967), pp. 189-202. Salomon (1964), pp. 45-49. 
63 Reher (2000), p. 354. 
64 Gelabert (1994), p. 188. 
 23 
c) The decline of product and population: crisis in Castilian agriculture (1590-1650) 
If the sale of baldíos was not the cause of Castilian decline at the end of sixteenth 
century, which was the real reason of that collapse? There was not an only cause and 
many of them were exogenous to the agrarian sector. Given that the roots of the agrarian 
expansion in Castile were in the market as this paper has showed in section IV, a, the 
reasons to decline probably come from the market. The expansion had happened when 
the curve of marginal revenue moved forward because of higher prices in agrarian 
products. The decline of countryside came because those prices went down and not only 
prices. There was also a destruction of marketplaces that had permitted to many 
peasants to sell their surplus close theirs lands. Without those markets, facing high 
transport cost, Castilian farmers were not ready to sell their products far away. In this 
context, a small farm producing just to consume had better opportunities to survive than 
other with a great production that could not be sold.  
Figure 3. Reduction of land plowed and migration (1590-1650) 
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When the sale of baldíos ended around the 1590s, Castilian agriculture was 
already involved in a huge economic crisis also affecting the rest of economy sectors. 
The production costs due to an increase in land prices and taxes were growing, while the 
profits dropped because the product price did not rise at the same rhythm and many 
markets disappeared. 
 24 
Figure 3 explains this process very clearly. In this period, the marginal physical 
product in many farms felt, showing a reduction of returns per acre and per worker. It 
could be explained by a reduction of physical product (decreasing returns) or by a 
reduction of product prices. The consequence was the shift of MRPland curve to the left 
(MRPland1). The model shows two effects. First, reductions of the amount of land used 
in the agriculture sector and second a fall of its price. Moreover, now, on the contrary 
that in the period before (1570-1590), the reduction of land was followed by a parallel 
reduction of factor labor. Data of Castile confirms both hypotheses. 
The situation of farmers was harder in some old baldíos for their less quality of 
soil. The agriculture expansion was built on the opening up of low-quality lands and 
incorporating more and more workers using the same archaic techniques65. As an 
example among many others, the inhabitants of Chamartín (Madrid) recognized this 
problem in 1579 when they said that the village had decayed because of the cultivation 
of “very poor and thin soils”66. There is considerable evidence that yields were declining 
in the last decades of the sixteenth-century67. Settlements in areas where the soil was 
poor therefore tended to lose population, or even to disappear. It was hard to maintain a 
family working in this kind of land, which carried proportionally the same burdens of 
dues, taxes and rents as the more fertile land. Almost all the baptismal records show a 
downward trend in the first forty years of the seventeenth century68. 
Only places, like Frentes and Vinuesa in Soria, increased the number of 
inhabitants even after 1580, because they had been working in other sectors such 
ranching and transport, increasing productivity while their population grew69. Now, 
even with the same problems of higher taxation and production costs of other villages, 
these sectors were productive enough to sustain the local population in those places. 
Why did people leave not only the countryside but also the cities of Castile? The 
population could have responded to this increase of costs by changing the countryside 
and agriculture for the city and a job in the industrial or commercial sector, but it was 
not a good option after the 1570s. The cities had entered in a period of deep crisis, which 
                                                 
65 Anes (1970), chapter 6. García Sanz (1977), chapters 2 and 5. 
66 Viñas y Mey (1949-71), p. 214. Anes (1994), p. 62. 
67 Weisser (1976), pp. 64-65. Brumont (1978), pp. 72-73. García Sanz, (1977), p. 94. 
68 Llopis (1994), p. 79. 
69 Díaz Sanz (1995), p. 39. 
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aggravated over time. The fiscal pressure was more intense there and the high expensive 
prices of agriculture products made it difficult to live in the urban centers. The 
population of Medina de Rioseco and Palencia did not grow after 156070. The records of 
baptisms in Medina del Campo show a tendency to decline71. The population of 
Salamanca dropped by 13,2 percent between 1569 and 159872. The same can be observed 
in Avila, Zamora, Leon and other Castilian cities73. These urban problems forced people 
working in the countryside even when net profits per unit of land were decreasing. 
Because there was neither place in other nearby villages or in the cities, the 
Castilian emigrants chose areas of the peninsula more dynamic economically than the 
Meseta. The periphery of the Peninsula, outside and inside Castile, attracted population 
because agriculture was not the only economic activity and markets worked better. 
There was a major movement of population from the center to the southern regions74 
and the coast of Mediterranean75 since the end of the sixteenth century. 
Cartagena is a great example of this process inside of Castile. This city located in 
the Mediterranean coast and its land grew continuously during the second half of the 
sixteenth and the first quarter of the seventeenth century76. Its growth, as the rest of 
Murcia, was stimulated by several economic sectors acting at the same time: fishing, 
agriculture, transport, trade, building, and small industries. 
On the contrary, in the hearth of Castile, that was expelling population, the 
amount of land under cultivation tended to fall. The poorest land was given over to 
pasture and the price of the land dropped.  
The movement of this curve also affects the cost of renting. Many landlords 
decided to reduce the price of rent in order to keep as many workers was possible in 
their lands. It pushed down the price of the land during the first half of the seventeenth 
century. Data available from rents also show that decline of prices. Rents of seven 
properties belonging to the monastery of El Escorial fell by 64,9 per cent between 1575 
and 1660, while the grain-lands of the Chapter of Segovia fell by 30 per cent only 
                                                 
70 Herrero (1984), p. 74. Figure. 
71 Marcos Martín (1978), pp. 92-93. 
72 Vela Santamaría (1983), pp. 281-322. 
73 Serafín de Tapia (1984), Fernández Vargas (1968) and Rueda (1981). 
74 Castillo (1965), pp. 719-733. 
75 Chacón Jiménez (1978), pp. 174-179. Pérez Moreda (1980), p. 246. Nadal (1984), pp. 33-35.  
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between the last years of the sixteenth century and the 1650s77. In the case of Sandoval 
can be observed a sharp decline from the period 1588-1593, explained as a reaction 
against the high price of the land rent78. (Table 4) 
Table 4. Trend of the rent of 14 lands of the monastery of Sandoval (1510-1691).  
Annual average of wheat. 
Periods Annual 
Average 
Index Ratio 
1510-1540 1920.7 100.00  
1569-1574 2237.0 116.47 0.49 (1540-1571) 
1588-1593 2572.0 133.91 0.79 (1571-1590) 
1684-1691 809.3 42.14 -1.17 (1590-1688) 
Source: Sebastian Amarilla (1990), tables 1 and 2. pp. 60 y 64. 
 
The same happened in other places. The monasteries or the aristocracy incomes 
from land rents suffered the same process of decadence after 1590, even when in those 
cases the problems were not related to indebtedness of peasants from “expensive” land 
purchases. The data collected from the monastery of Santa Espina show a similar trend. 
The rent in Benafarces, between 1567 and 1610, was cut by 50 per cent, and by 31 per 
cent in Villalonso. In Vegamayor and Monreal the fall started later79. 
In this third period, the agricultural sector suffered just the contrary effect to 
what happened during the first years studied here. Now, the marginal revenue of the 
land (MRPland) shifted to the left because of reductions in the marginal physical 
product, but especially in the agriculture prices. It expelled many workers from the 
countryside. Sometimes, it was not necessary a reduction of prices but a growing 
difficulty to sell the product in the markets. At the end of sixteenth century transaction 
costs were growing in the Castilian commercial sector. In fact, many local markets 
disappeared. It happened at the same time that many cities of Castile were in a process 
of collapse. The only city that did not suffer this process was Madrid as center of the 
empire. 
Without any new technology, the reduction of land cultivated implied a decline 
in the production too. There was a sharp drop in the production of the most important 
cereals (wheat and barley) between the 1580s and the 1630s. This fall in cereal 
                                                                                                                                                 
76 Montojo (1993), p. 37. Torres Sanchez (1987), pp. 250-251. The trend of annual increase was by 1.7 percent in 1560-
1580, 1.5 percent in 1580-1600 and 0.6 in 1600-1620. 
77 Llopis (1994), p. 87. López García (1990), p. 287. 
78 Sebastian Amarilla (1990), p. 61. 
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production has been estimated at almost 40 per cent80. By the latter date average yearly 
cereal production barely exceeded half of what it had been around 157081. Average 
annual grain tithes in the province of Palencia fell by approximately 50 per cent between 
the 1580s and the 1660s82. 
V. Conclusions 
Traditionally, the evolution of the agriculture in Castile during the sixteenth 
century has been studied only from the point of view of production costs. A small 
farmer outside of market has been taken for granted. Markets would be controlled 
exclusively by the most powerful sector of the society, the nobility and the church, 
because they received most of the surplus through rents and tithes. Any development of 
the market would not affect the incentives of the small peasant to produce more. The 
Castilian structure of land ownership avoided any changes of this picture over time. 
From this point of view, the expansion of agriculture that took place in Castile 
between 1520 and 1570 was caused by the necessity to feed a growing population, 
always close to the level of subsistence, as many scholars explain. The baldíos and 
common lands were a great relief for the population and one of its best allies because it 
allowed them to plow more land without paying rents. Baldíos were free land for 
hungry peasants. 
The situation changed when Philip II became king and his European policy 
demanded higher funds. The Monarchy decided to increase taxes and to sell part of its 
patrimony in order expand its revenues. The baldíos and other common lands managed 
by the municipalities were suddenly put in the market. Higher taxes and the increase of 
the land price meant a steady rise in the production costs faced by many peasants, many 
of them plowing poor and marginal soils. It represented the decline of the small farmers 
and their deep indebtedness. 
The sale of baldíos has been seen as the key in the general crisis that affected 
Castile from 1590 onward, because it caused the ruin of a major part of the population. 
For that, the sale of baldíos has been frequently used to explain the decadence of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
79 López García (1990), pp. 110-111. 
80 García Sanz (1994), p. 22.  
81 Llopis (1994), p. 79. López-Salazar (1981), pp. 56-101. 
82 Marcos Martín (1985), vol. I, p. 234. 
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whole Castilian’s economy. According to many authors, many peasants lost the land 
that they had been working. The unemployment in the countryside spread the poverty 
over Castile during the 1580s and the 1590s. As a consequence, many peasants had to 
migrate to other regions, provoking a sharp decline in agricultural production. It is easy 
to draw from this theory that the responsibility of the agrarian crisis at the end of 
sixteenth century lies in a conspiracy formed by the rich and the Crown against the 
small farmer. 
This paper tries to analyze this issue from another perspective. Instead of 
focusing attention only on the negative effects derived from the changes in the 
production costs, this paper pays attention to the incentives of the small farmer to 
increase production. Why did the population want to work in the countryside invading 
marginal lands? Why did the expansion take place through increasing the land 
ploughed? Maybe, it happened because profits from the agriculture did not go only to 
the highest sector of the society.  
In order to understand the decadence of Castilian agriculture and look for its 
causes, it is necessary first to forget some extended clichés about the style of life in the 
Castilian countryside. Now we have historical evidence to think that Castilian peasants 
were not continuously at the level of subsistence. 
The growth of Castilian cities, the improvements in the Castilian farmer’s level of 
life, the great development of all sort of markets, especially those related to the rural 
sector like the fairs, the increasing demand of agricultural products from overseas 
enterprises like America, the continuous tendency of agrarian prices to increase, 
maintained for years. All these facts invite one to think that the small farmer had strong 
incentives on improving his revenues from agriculture just by increasing the amount 
produced using more land. Baldíos, as Castilian agrarian institution, made it easy, 
because the cost of land remained frozen until the 1570s. 
The sale of baldíos from 1570 and the parallel increase of fiscal pressure, delayed 
during years, pushed up the production cost curve faced by many peasants. In some 
cases, it was just an adjustment to the real cost that the land had suddenly. The Crown 
wanted its part of profits derived from the successful agriculture sector. Many peasants 
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worked on marginal soils because they did not have to pay the cost of use of these lands. 
This group was the more affected by the sale of baldíos.  
However, while the demand of agrarian products remained strong, many 
peasants could stay in their land even paying more or borrowing to pay the new highest 
costs. The sale of baldíos was not the reason why the Castilian agriculture entered in a 
deep decadence after 1590s. If baldíos were not profitable for peasants they would not be 
profitable for buyers either. The sale of land by the Crown only change who got the 
revenues form land plowed. Before the sale, peasants benefited form those free lands 
and after the sale, new buyers did. Some of them were the same workers and others 
were nobility, church and businessmen. But nothing change able to expel people from 
the countryside. Neither the sale of baldíos nor the increase of fiscal pressure can explain 
why people leave Castilian countryside at the end of sixteenth century. 
The real problem arrived when the same causes that had provoked the 
agricultural expansion disappeared. Problems surged in the Castilian markets, reduced 
the benefits of peasants, making it impossible for many to obtain profits from their work 
in poor and now expensive lands. The decadence of small fairs and local markets during 
the 1570s and 1580s kept prices high in the cities while farmers had fewer opportunities 
to sell their surplus. Many peasants became more self-sufficient. 
Also the downward trend of the agrarian yields (MPPa) made it impossible for 
many to keep working in the countryside. This group had to migrate. As a consequence 
of the exit of many people from agriculture, total production dropped sharply. The loss 
of population affected the demand over the whole Castilian economy, starting a trend of 
decadence that did not end until the second half of the seventeenth century. 
A great part of the Castilian agrarian expansion was due to external factors. They 
were responsible to the great incentives to increase output quickly. In the same way, 
when those factors entered in crisis, they had a rapid influence over agrarian demand. 
The reason why the crisis was so hard and permanent, lasting almost a century, seems to 
be more related to the way that the initial expansion took place than to the problems in 
the cost of production at the end of the century. 
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